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Abstract 
In Italy we currently have a lot of national and regional instruments for financial aids to enterprises. Most 
of them are not specialized, as syntethetized in the following points: 
1.  they are refferred to the whole Italian territory; 
2.  they have generic objects (increase of GNP, reduction of growth differences among regions, 
employment); 
3.  they are applied to all the sectors of production; 
4.  they have common methods of application (automatic, discretional, negotiated). 
This means that we establish general purposes without further specialization even if we fall into particular 
purposes. 
In addition to this types of subsides, there are anymore that are specialized both at territorial and at 
sectorial level. Among these, the most important are distributed by the Territorial Pacts that are one of the 
instruments of concerted planning.  
In this paper we firstly define the specialization of some forms of subsidies; then we analize the 
performance of two samples of enterprises, that are located in the Apulia Region (NUTS III), the first of 
which has been benefiting from the state support provided by law n.488/92 (Financial support of the 
productive activities in depressed zones), and the second one that has been benefiting from the support 
provided by Territorial Pacts.  
The enterprises performance have been assessed through quantitative index measured by three main 
relations:  
1.  Sales / Assets, that is an indicator measuring the firms efficiency. So it indicates if the total value of 
sales they’ve carried out, can account for the effectuated investments.  
2.  Profit / Sales, that estimate the enterprise ability to obtain profits, aging in the market, and let us 
having indications about prospects of success. 
3.  Profit / Assets, that assess, in a better way, the capacity in terms of global income of the enterprise. 
Comparing the average of the three indicators considered, related to supported enterprises, with the same 
indexes of Mediobanca sample about not-supported enterprises, we obtain interesting results. 
They have proved that: 
A.  the enterprises having supports are, generally, less efficient than those having no support; 
B.  the firms subsided by Territorial Pacts are more efficient than the other ones subsided by law 
n.488/92. 
From the investigation it emerges that the subsides territorially oriented are more efficient than the 
general support, referred to the same area. So, if we privilege efficiency results, putting the effectiveness 
ones in a secondary position, we probably should prefer an automatic but specialized aid system, at least 
from the territorial, dimensional and productive point of view according to preference scales. But, if we 
want to obtain effectiveness standards too, it is necessary to specialize the interventions and determine 
specific goals and result indicators.   2 
 
1  Introduction 
 
Italian firms can potentially benefit from 460 financial aid schemes for investments, but 
those operative are about 90 (Ministry of Industry 2000; Ministry of Economic 
Activities 2002). Such a number is anyway high, and it would allow for the 
specialization of schemes, in terms of aims, criteria, sectional and territorial target, 
evaluation modalities. The reality is a bit different, since the vast majority of these 
schemes are not specialized because: 
1.  they are referred to the hole Italian territory (70% of all types of the instruments 
actually aging); 
2.  they have generic objectives (60% of them  concerns generic objectives as to lead 
the growth of production, to improve population welfare, to increase the 
internationalisation of business, etc.); 
3.  they are applied to all sectors of production (50%) 
4.  they subside both SMEs and big enterprises (72%) 
5.  they have common methods of application (discretional evaluation is adopted by 
86% of all instruments). 
This means that we establish general purposes without further specialization even if we 
fall into particular purposes. In such a situation the only exception is represented  by a 
few instruments, among which Territorial Pacts can  be found. These provide 
specialized incentives on the sector (industry, tourism and instrumental infrastructures, 
agriculture and fishery), territory (areas constrained to the municipalities/province 
boundaries associated in the Pact) and size (SMEs) ground, they also adopt specific 
objectives in terms of evaluation indicators (although they are not always consistent and 
complete) and finally they couple firms aid schemes with those for infrastructures, that 
are functional both to entrepreneurial undertakings and to the general aims of the Pact. 
Such a specialization is due to the fact that, within a constrained territorial dimension, 
firms’ sector and dimensional diversification  are  contained, collective expectations and 
objectives are less generic and, most importantly, the interests of each party are less in 
conflict than in greater territorial contexts.  
Many surveys have been carried out about Territorial Pacts. Each of them was based 
upon macro-qualitative indicators of tendency, or indicators stemming from indirect 
information provided by local experts, involved in the organisation and management of   3 
the Pact. Such a way of investigation has something of apodictic. Actually, it is unlikely 
that organisations involved in the management of the Pact can state their own 
inefficiency, since they’d loose the rationale for their role in the Pact, and hence for 
having financial resources (Ministry of Economy and Treasury 1988, 2000, 2001, 2002, 
2003; Ministry of Industry 2000). Moreover, such a methodology has given rise to an 
over-reaction, in terms of unjustified both optimism and scepticism. We argue this is 
due to the misunderstanding of the quantitative objectives as well as the very features of 
Territorial Pacts. 
The former are easily understandable, since it is evident that in areas which are affected 
by high structural unemployment, the main aims are represented by the widening of the 
production system and employment increase. But these aims to all development policies 
targeted to areas characterised by labour supply exceeding demand. The Pacts’ 
innovative element consists of the ex-ante identification of the conditions able to lower 
the dynamic uncertainty intrinsic to production investments within specific territorial 
areas, also in exception to norms and market conditions. All subjects adhering to the 
Pact fix such conditions, acknowledging agreements and constraints, and elaborate a 
local action plan which represents a real integrated development plan. Within this 
framework, the main purpose of the evaluation is to understand to what extent results 
have been pursued (effectiveness), and whether the involved subjects have been 
coherent with their commitment (efficiency), that is represented by the following points: 
1)  Labour market flexibility, in order to increase the employment rate; 
2)  Rate of interest reduction, in order to lower the risk and rise the amount of 
investments (firms-banks pact): did banks lower rates of interest and, mainly, extend 
this reduction to all the market? 
3)  Shortening of Administrations decision time, adaptation of infrastructures to 
production needs and local taxation reduction (firms-administration pact). 
Once firms’ needs have been identified, it is natural to wonder: 
a)  Are the involved organisations the most indicate to stipulate such kinds of 
agreements and to pursue the mentioned results, within a globalisation context of 
economic systems and of currency unification? 
b)  Does the proliferation of Pacts make them less specialised, and the Italian local 
development policy less effective?  
It doesn’t seem that the mentioned surveys have attempted to quantify the expected 
results, as above specified, and provided useful data to evaluate the real specialisation of   4 
the pact as local development instrument. We argue that this is due to the neglecting of 
firm’s expectations and performance in previous research projects. On the contrary, 
firms are the main subjects intervening in all the Pact’s constitutive agreements. 
Moreover, firms are the most critical and sceptical subjects with respect to 
Administrations capabilities in local development planning. This is a task more complex 
than in the generic policies for growth and employment, since local development plans 
attract the attention to the planning activity rather than to the funds provision. Hence 
they ask for a deep knowledge of the socio-economic context of intervention, an ability 
to propose and plan, and the specialisation of the different measures according to local 
needs. 
For these reasons, we preferred to focus the attention upon firms, provided that such a 
kind of analysis is long and complex, and that it calls for the availability of a large 
amount of data, many of which are accessible just through the direct interaction with 
entrepreneurs. 
In fact, the evaluation of Pacts’ efficiency depends, in our opinion, on their ability to 
produce the expect additional results, with respect to the results that would have been 
reached without the existence of the Pacts, and the effects upon firms’ performance, in 
terms of returns. It seems evident that such kinds of evaluation have major difficulties, 
since they try to face the evaluation problem from both a macro- and micro-quantitative 
point of view.  
In this paper we report partial results, stemming for a more complex and articulated 
research project, in which we adopt firms’ performance as a proxy of the specific 
objectives of Territorial Pacts. If such performance indicators reveal positive results, it 
is likely that the Pact has realized its mission, at least partially. If this is not the case, it 
is almost certain that the Pact failed. However, before evaluating efficiency, it seems 
necessary to investigate Pacts’ effectiveness. Although still limited, it allow us to 
understand if they are specialised local development instruments, and if the selected 
organisations for their implementation, are the most able to pursue their objectives. 
 
2  Is the Pact a specialised instrument? A normative interpretation 
 
Territorial Pacts were born in the early 90s, within the broader revision process of the 
regional policy model in Italy, as suggested by the European Union, and based upon the 
two principles of bottom-up planning and the social partnership.   5 
The first principle is due to the need of creating local managers able to autonomously 
plan and manage their own development, on the basis of a model shared by the different 
local actors. These employ the collective decision-making as working method, in order 
to allow for a self-propelling development. 
Actually, the term “Pact” is referred to a negotiated procedure, that allows for the 
involvement of the whole community into actions aimed at creating common interests 
and a higher awareness climate. The term “Territorial” emphasizes the choose of 
valorising the endogenous resources of the area, its “vocations”, actualising local 
potentialities. 
The body of legislation ruling Territorial Pacts is the result of a long-lasting process of 
elaboration and revision, characterized by the reiterate change of rules, and that has 
finally defined three different typologies of Pact, each with different implementation 
and financing modalities: 
−  Generic
2, i.e. opened to every sector specialisation, whose maximum subsided 
amount is 51,64 million Euros 
−  Specialised
3, i.e. targeted to fishery and agriculture, whose maximum amount is 
25,82 million Euros; 
−  European or for employment, belonging to the pilot project of Community initiative, 
aimed at creating employment in objective-areas exposed to territorial and market 
changes. 
All Territorial Pacts also fund the realization of infrastructures functional to production 
activities, within the 30% of the maximum eligible amount. Likewise, the share of the 
entrepreneurs’ financial capital should exceed 30% of the specific investment. Other 
Community, national and regional resources can be added, but the intensity of the aid 
can’t restrict the force of normative limits and constraints ruling the aid scheme. 
Actually, there are 230 Territorial Pacts at the national level, of which 220 are national 
initiatives and 10 for employment. However, these figures characterize the Pact as 
instrument rather as institution. This is to say that to the Pact-as-institution can belong 
to a generic pact, or pact for employment, or to one or more specific pacts.  
If a classification ought to be carried out of the pact as an institution, and hence on the 
basis of the territory rather than the instrument, the Pacts would reduced to 170, of 
which 97 comprehensive of specialized pacts.   6 
Although the Pacts have been extend on the whole National territory (while the original 
formulation was only targeted to objective-1 regions), at the state of the art more than 
2/3 of the 220 national Pacts are localised in objective-1 regions.   7 
 
Tab. 1 – National Territorial Pacts (€*000) 









Not specialized  82  47  129    8.354.005,9     3.718.969,1  
Specialized in agricolture and fishing  67  24  91    2.188.394,2     1.385.765,2  
Total  149  71  220  10.542.400,1     5.104.734,3  
Source: Ministero del Tesoro. Author's calculations  
 
As a preliminary conclusion, hence, it could be stated that the instrument is not 
jeopardized by the territorial diffusion, nor it lowers the effectiveness of local 
development policies. This because it is an instrument specialised in terms of sectors, 
areas and size. Moreover, other surveys has proved that the involvement of local actors 
and the amount of induced investments are so high that the pact can be considered a 
successful instrument. 
In fact, active Pacts, that is those Pacts who received at a least a public contribution, 
were 200 at May 2003, in addition to the 10 European Pacts. But they as a whole have 
absorbed about 1,1 billions Euros, that is the 22,5% of the available funds (Table 2) 
The analysis of the ratio between active Pacts and provided funds (30
th May, 2003), 
disentangling generic and specialised Pacts, provide some relevant insights. Within the 
non-specialised Pacts, 88% of existing Pacts is active, since 11 Pacts are still waiting for 
the Decrect, while some first generation pacts are now finished. Within the specialized 
Pacts, 94,5% of those existing is active, even if they have obtained a lower share of 
funds (20,6% vs. 23,3%, see Fig. 1). This evidence confirms the observations relative to 
the age of the pacts and to the delays, and hence, it could be a temporary waste of 
resources. 
Further relevant implications can be extracted by the territorial distribution of provided 
funds, with regard to involved firms and the solidity of the conditions at the foundations 
of the Pact. Actually Objective 1 regions have absorbed 43,6% of financial aids, albeit 
they represent the 63,5% of national active instrument-Pacts. 
This may be related to the higher strength of the coalitions involving non-Objective 1 
regions and/or to the higher concentration in other regions of specialised pacts. 
However, the number of entrepreneurial projects shows a similar trend, since some of 
them haven’t been realised, albeit considered eligible to financial aids. This aspect   8 
should be deeply analysed because of the case of renounce, as the following analysis 
will prove. 
These delays in the implementation plans prove a general inefficiency that, anyway, it 
doesn’t seem to lower Pacts’ specificity and their territorial, sectional and dimensional 
specificity. 
 
Tab. 2 - Pacts situation per type at 05/30/2003 (€*000).  
 Pacts Types  Existing  Operative  Public 
Investments 
Founds  provided 
Not specialized  129  114  3.718.969,10           867.212,91  
Specialized     91    86  1.385.765,20           284.760,79  
 Total  220  200  5.104.734,30        1.151.973,69  
Source: Ministry of Economy and Treasury (2003) 
 
 
Tab. 3 - Pacts situation per regions at 05/30/2003 (€*000). 
Regions Existing 
Pacts 
Provided Founds  
Objective 1  127  501.800,25 
Others 73  650.173,44 
Total 200  1.151.973,69 
Source: Ministry of Economy and Treasury (2003) 
 
Fig. 1 - Pacts situation per type at 05/30/2003.  
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Source: Ministry of Economy and Treasury (2003). Author's calculations  
 
3  Is the Pact a specialised instrument? A suggested interpretation by a regional 
survey 
 
The previous conclusion doesn’t seem to be acceptable if you shift the viewpoint from 
the national to the regional level. We carried out a research on the territorial articulation 
of Territorial Pacts operating in Apulian region, in order in order both to better 
understand the way in which Pacts are used,  and to shed a light upon the intensity of 
their use. 
Apulian municipalities involved into the Pacts actually are 239, distributed among 27 
instrument-Pacts, whose leaders totally are 14. Five of these manage 3 Pacts, each 
belonging to a different typology, while three lead 2 pacts of different typologies too. 
Generally a coincidence between the subject in charge and the territorial domain can be 
found, since the subject represents the whole actors which negotiate and pursue the 
development plan of a particular area. In these cases it is usual the existence of a sole 
institution-Pact, which is the guarantor in the planning-table in which the consensus and 
the involvement of the whole interests are formed. 
In Apulian region such kinds of situation are all situated in the Bari province, and they 









Operative Pacts Provided Founds
Regions Objective 1 Other regions  10 
−  Area Metropolitana di Bari, that is articulated in three instrument-Pacts (generic, 
agricultural, tourism), having the same organisation in charge for the whole 
territory; 
−  Patto Conca Barese, consisting of two instrument-Pacts (generic, agricultural), 
managed by just an organisation; 
−  Patto Nord-Barese Ofantino, operating through 2 instrument-Pacts (EU-
employment, agricultural), in charge to the same organisation, and both 
comprehensive of the same area; 
−  Sistema Murgiano, that consists of 3 instrument-Pacts (generic, agricultural, generic 
additive protocol), led by one organisation, in charge of the whole area. 
Conversely, there also are situations in which one organisation manages Pacts 
belonging to the same typology, but covering different geographical areas. This is the 
case of the Società Patto di Foggia SCPA, which is an organisation in charge of the 
generic Patto di Foggia, and of the fishery-specialized Patto di Foggia, both covering 
the same territorial area. Morevoer, the generic Patto Ascoli Satriano-Candela-
Sant’Agata di Puglia overlaps with the previous one in the municipality of Ascoli 
Satriano. 
Likewise, the Camber of Commerce of Taranto is in charge of two different generic 
Pacts and one agriculture-specialized, since it is manager of the Patto di Taranto (which 
just involve the chief municipality), but also the Patto of Castellaneta-Crispiano-Ginosa-
Martina Franca and the Patto Agricolo della Fascia Orientale Provincia di Taranto, 
involving a wider territorial basis. 
As a conclusion, it can be observed that, within the 239 Apulian municipalities involved 
in the Pacts, 27 have taken part in more than a institution-Pact, i.e are interested by 
different Pacts, in terms of typology, territory and responsible organisation. Finally, and 
more importantly, in many cases such different Pacts are competitors, both in terms of 
resources and objectives. 
In our opinion such examples represent worst-practices. Firstly since the managing 
organisation of a Pact should represent the collective interests aimed at fostering the 
local development of a specific territory, which in turn has different paths due to the 
different resources endowment. Secondly, every institution-Pact compete with the 
others for accessing development resources, that of course are scarce. Hence, the 
managing of different Pacts by a singular organisation appears to be a non-sense.   11 
Moreover, the creation of new organisations specifically tailored for managing many 
institution Pacts may lead to a higher bureaucracy, while such instruments are to be 
linked to local specificities and to the market. At the same time, assigning the 
management to pre-existing organisations, that represent the interests of particular 




4  Is the Pact a specialised instrument? A suggested interpretation on the basis of 
firms’ performance 
 
The evidence of Territorial Pacts appears to be difficult enough to be evaluated, within 
the context of their normative and real evolution, as previously described. Drawing 
upon the available data, an evaluation can be proposed, with respect to two different 
aspects: 
1.  the efficiency of the instrument, measured as the ratio between the mission and the 
results actually pursued; 
2.  the effectiveness of the instrument, conceived as the ratio between the employed 
resources and the pursued results. 
The first aspect stems from the five points stressed in the introduction, which synthesize 
Pacts’ mission; the second one is based on the following indicators: 
−  Time to implementation of the Pact; 
−  Ratio between the number of initiatives actually started and those funded; 
−  Ratio between the amount of public funds provided and the planned one; 
−  Time to funds provision with regard to the manager’s receipt.  
At the state of the art, we don’t have a sufficient data amount in order to make such a 
complex evaluation. This obstacle can be overcome through resorting to proxy, 
although partial, variables, in terms of both effectiveness and efficiency. In this 
direction some firm’s performance indicators can be used, with regard to firms 
operating within the context of some Apulian Pacts. 
For this intermediate and instrumental purpose, four Territorial Pacts have been 
individuated (Area Metropolitana Bari, Conca Barese, Sud-Est Barese, Sistema 
Murgiano), that are homogenous according to the following features: 
−  Typology, since they all are generic; 
−  Generation, that is of 2
nd generation;   12 
−  Localisation, i.e. all belonging to the Bari province; 
−  Advancement, i.e. all being operative since 1999, and being consistent with the 
minimum thresholds of return, as expressed by the provided resources and the 
implemented initiatives. 
 
Tab. 4 - Identifcative information about the investigated Pacts  (€*000) 
Pact name  Type 
Approved by   Municipality  Territorial 
extention  
Population** 
   Decree n.  date    kmq  
Area metropolitana Bari  Not specialized   991  29/01/99  12          459,52            513.136  
Conca barese  Not specialized  1060  31/05/99  7          713,00           263.006  
Sud-Est barese Polis  Not specialized  1062  31/05/99  11          910,61            226.394  
Sistema Murgiano  Not specialized  976  29/01/99  10       1.737,00    213.792*  
Total        40       3.820,13     1.216.328*  
Bari district remaining      9       1.477,87            328.347  
* Including  Laterza municipality in  Taranto district 
**Censimento generale della Popolazione 1991, Istat. Basic data from Pacts original agreement. 
 
Tab. 5 - Investigated Pacts' Firms (€*000) 
Pacts name  Firms  Firms' total investiments   Public Founds  
Area metropolitana di Bari  57      49.995,09      22.235,02  
Conca barese  27      19.064,44        9.116,13  
Sud-Est barese Polis  58      60.954,83      25.570,30  
Sistema Murgiano  21      25.482,71      12.447,13  
Total  163    155.497,07      69.368,58  
Source: Direct Pacts' investigation 
 
The total number of aided firms within the four Pacts are 163 (see Table 5). Among 
these, we just interviews joint stock firms within the manufacturing sector, that are 72. 
The direct survey and the features of the requested information give still rise to 
diffidence and unwillingness to cooperate, causing delays in the research work. 
Among the sampled firms, 13 have refused to benefit of the funds for different reasons, 
generally linked to delays in the provision stage. For this reason, some entrepreneurs 
preferred to resort to funds provided within the context of the national law 488/92 and 
within the so-called “credito di imposta”, more rapid and with fixed deadlines. In some 
cases firms refused the obtained funds because the unavailability of own capital, while 
in other cases firms applied for financial aids after the deadlines. At the moment, valid 
firms’ responses are 20, and are referred to restructuring or widening works. In no 
cases, anyway, new undertakings can be found. The realised investments will be 
operative by the end of 2003.   13 
The fact that new firms have not provided information can be due to many factors, such 
as technical constraints, the choice to limit the analysis to operative firms, the 
unwillingness of innovative entrepreneurs to provide information about their own 
activity. Such reasons don’t allow for concluding that Territorial Pacts favoured 
restructuring or widening interventions, which in turn are the main aims of other 
financial aid schemes. 
In this first stage of the research work, we try to provide an evaluation of the Pacts’ 
efficiency through the use of three investments return indexes: 
(1)  Capital turnover = Sales / Assets 
Such ratio is a synthetic indicator of firms’ profitability, since provide the marginal 
product of each € of return. Provided that assets also comprehend fixed capital, such 
indicator tells us also whether the amount of sales gives the investment economic 
profitability. It is likely that low levels of such an index mean an excess of investments 
with respect to market penetration. 
(2)   Return on sales = Ebit / Sales 
This ratio (ROS) allows for the evaluation of firm’s ability to operate in the market and 
the quantification of the amount sales becoming operative income. This indicator 
provide a synthetic link among prices, sales amount and operative costs, provided the 
turnover. 
(3)  Returns on assets = Ebit / Assets 
The ROA represents an indicator of the profitability of firm’s management. It 
synthesizes the previous indexes, allowing for the assessment of firm’s ability to gain 
profits from the whole activity, employing a specific amount of capital. 
Such indexes have been calculated with respect to the period 2000-2002, so that 
modifications between the starting and the operative stages can be analysed. Each, per 
se, index suggests often negative conclusions. As a whole, indeed, they provide a more 
positive framework. Let us consider each of them. 
Capital turnover, in the considered period, is higher than 1, but has a decreasing trend. 
Such a dynamic could be explained by the contingent economic conditions and with the 
decrease of internal demand, together with the loss of competitiveness of Apulian firms 
during the 2002. By reducing the amount of sales, it appears to be evident a 
disequilibrium between investment levels and sales. This is to say that investments 
which are planned in a positive expectations context, are likely to suffer of an 
hypertrophy when the economic cycle change its direction. If we compare the index   14 
with that calculated for a sample of firms that benefited of the law 488/92 and with the 
Mediobanca sample, our sample seems to have clearly better performances (Gurrieri, 
Lorizio, Losurdo 2000). This can be explained by the higher flexibility of firms 
participating to the Pacts, since they are above all small firms, as well as by the 
tendency to hypertrophy of firms funded by the law 488/92. 
The ROS increases as investments that are funded by Pacts become operative. This 
means that the proximity to the maximum production capacity implies better operative 
costs when prices are stable a slightly fluctuant, as in the considered period. Actually, 
the return on sales seems to be positive, if we compare firms aided by Pacts (10,2%), 
with the sample of firms aided by the law 488/92 and the Mediobanca sample (both at 
6%). 
The ROA also has a positive trend in during the period 2000-2002, confirming the 
increasing profitability if firms belonging to Pacts, and has an average value of 10%, 
which is in turn higher than the values for 488/92 firms (4%) and Mediobanca sample 
(5%). 
The joint analysis of the three indexes provides a picture of funded firms as inclined to 
sales rather than to investments. This is understandable by considering that they are 
small firms, accustomed to operate in the market, and that have restructured or widened 
their facilities by means of Pacts’ funds. This also explains why the performance is 
better than in the two comparing samples, in which funding schemes favour initiatives 
at over-dimensioned investments, with a scarce knowledge of the market (Scalera, 
Zazzaro 2000).  
 
 
Tab. 6 - Firms' Balance indexes Average 
 
CAPITAL 
TURNOVER   
ROS   ROA 
2000 1,057  0,094  0,092 
2001 1,080  0,101  0,104 
2002 0,907  0,112  0,104 
Average 2000-2002  1,015  0,102  0,100 
Author's calculations 
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5  Suggestions for regional policy 
 
The experience of Pacts, even if it’s still unfolding, is enough rich to give important 
indications for regional and local development policies. These are so much necessaries 
as much concerted planning and its instruments are managing by Regions. The study of 
four pacts localized in the Bari district showed that the business subsided by pacts have 
had a better performance than those subsided by L. 488/92 or not financially supported. 
If this conclusion was confirmed even into different territorial areas and so it excludes 
the influence of general context conditions about the business performance, could be 
concluded that local coalitions made around pacts as institutions are working and 
obtaining the main objectives of local development policy, that are the production 
enlargement and the employment increasing. 
There are different considerations about other missions that, in our opinion, are 
improperly charged on the Pact. First suggestion given by Pacts experience is that 
programmes and the instruments for concerted planning have to be specialised and 
designed on local communities real expectations because these are actors of economic 
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In E.U. we can recognise four economic policy levels, having specific missions and 
instruments of intervention. First and the second one are over-national and national 
levels, by which are depending general economic policies (monetary, fiscal, balance, 
change) and general rules, that influence successfully perspectives of development 
policies at regional and local levels (political economy third and forth levels). In E.U. 
the enforcement of over-national government of economy marks an increasing 
reinforcement of regional and sub-regional government levels (Camagni 2002). 
Pacts demonstrate the action capacity of sub-regional government, on condition that are 
defined its missions. The ambition of giving to this government degree the capacity of 
following labour market flexibility is a non-sense for all kinds of economic law and real 
demonstration, at least in Italy. Firstly because the added costs of labour are established 
by collective contracts that cannot be modify at local level. Secondly because even a 
high decrease of labour direct costs cannot change the range of disadvantage 
comparative to low labour cost countries; and than because labour flexibility is only a 
part of system flexibility which cannot be obtained just through the decrease of salary 
and the variability of labour organization, but through the administrative proceedings 
simplification, fix times of decision making, of procedures and of public administration 
obligations, of questioner clear identification too.   
At the same way, the imposition by law or by agreements of interest rates ratios during 
monetary union, means forget a basic economic rule that established how in an open 
market savings try to find the most advantage business, instead local business, being 
smaller, are charged to a higher risk (Giannola, Sarno 1998). In addition the decrease of 
local taxes, without fiscal federalism, cannot be applied at local level and however it 
might fall into a strict taxable income.  
Finally, the planning of big infrastructures cannot be put in practice by regional and 
sub-regional governments capacity of planning and financing. Differently , a specific 
work of these governments, is promote and realise, even with local resources 
participation, infrastructures of local and regional value (as pacts are doing), and built 
local  knowledge coalitions for research and training programs  realization about human 
capital, whose technical and financial dimension cannot renounce to the regional, 
national and over-national financial support.  
Such policies should be designed at the super-national and national level of governance, 
while the regional and sub-regional levels should have different aims. Regions should 
perform activities of orientation and choice of strategies and organisational models for   17 
the management of resources both of European and national origin. Unfortunately, 
regions use to carry out executive activities and to distribute resources, with the 
probability of jeopardize useful instruments such as the Pacts. 
 Hence it appears to be risky to charge the management of Pacts on Regions, which in 
turn have fostered the self-determination of local subjects and their ability to cooperate. 
The overlapping of Pacts with local development plans, which have ex-ante objectives 
and allow local administrations just the task of reporting, is likely to repress the self-
organising capacities of local cooperating subjects. 
The regionalisation process of Pacts should have the following aims: 
a) Strengthening of institution-Pacts, implementation of a permanent local development 
agency (aimed ad fostering both inward and outward foreign direct investments, 
information, training, etc.), and implementation of the instrument-pact through 
programs like specialised integrated programs. 
b) Widening of elaboration capacity of technical and planning instruments, of selection, 
orientation and assistance in terms of regional economic policy and local development, 
also through the introduction of new organisational models. 
c) The adoption of innovative instruments for credit access, allowing for the lowering of 
bank dependence (Busetta, Sacco 2001). 
d) Inserting institution-Pacts among proceedings of the regional planning itself. 
 
6  Conclusions 
 
The territorial pact has proved to be a specialised planning instrument, for the financing 
of local development programs, above all with regard to sectional, territorial and 
dimensional specialisation. Local coalitions have given rise to a governance level of 
economy, that is the local one, which has been usually neglected. Such a result is due to 
a new protagonist role of involved subjects into coalitions. These are proving to be the 
most able to give local policies a vitality, provided they are not over-charged of tasks. 
One of the relevant effects of Pacts’ specificities is that firms operate within an 
environment increasingly oriented to production. This fact explains because the firms 
subsided by Pacts are more efficient than the other ones.  
Although the success cases in Pacts experience are frequent, there are many indications 
that demonstrate how the centrality of local coalitions within the institutional context is 
less shared by regional governments and so Pacts experience should be considered   18 
closed. If this is the destiny of the Pacts, at least positive results should be emphasized, 
trying to save local development policies from the introduction of great instruments 
with small results. Of course local communities should have a management function, 
and then they should represent collective interests and mobilize local resources. 
According to this view, the extension of the Pact to Objective 2 and 5b regions should 
not be considered as an expression of instrument's inflation. On the contrary, it proves 
the Pact’s flexibility and the adaptability to local needs and to specificity of local 
expectations, that are sources of its specialisation. 
The main fear is that regionalisation of concerted planning is a solution theoretically 
correct but practically risky for the possibility of local coalitions to manage their own 
development. New planning instruments at the regional level don’t provide a great 
autonomy to local coalitions, since they fix objectives, field and instruments of 
intervention, trying to re-propose orientation and control functions, which Regions 
usually miss in the management of regional economic policies.  
 
NOTES 
1.The work is the result of the authors’ common research. Francesco Losurdo 
supervised par. 1, 4, 5, 6; Annamaria Stramaglia supervised par. 2 and 3. 
2.CIPE Decision 21 marzo 1997, "Disciplina della Programmazione Negoziata", 
published in G.U. n.105 dell'8 maggio 1997. 
3.CIPE Decision 11 novembre 1998, “Estensione degli strumenti previsti dalla 
programmazione negoziata all’agricoltura ed alla pesca”, published in G.U. del 
7/1/1999 acting title n. 10 of Law Decree 30/04/1998. 
4.Agreement between the Ministry of Economy and Treasury, the Ministry of Industry, 
the Regions , ANCI, UPI, UNCEM according to title n. 9, 2, c) of Law Decree 28 
August 1997, n. 281, published in G.U. 19 May 2003 n.114. 
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